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1
Introduction

On May 20, 1982, President Ronald Reagan signed the National Security Decision
Directive Number 32. NSDD-32 authorized “diplomatic propaganda, political and military
measures to repress the expansion of Soviet control and military presence around the globe.”
The National Security Strategy document also includes a covert action element that would
sponsor “demonstrations, protests, press articles, television shows and more.” Then, on
September 2, President Reagan signed the NSDD-54 into law; the document was titled “U.S.
Policy Towards Eastern Europe,” which declared to remove the Soviet Union presence in
Eastern Europe; thus, re-unifying it with Western Europe. However, the NSDD-75 would
become the most strategic and unique document in U.S. history. The NSDD-75 had many ways
in which it was carried out. Still, the most significant way the policy discouraged the Soviet
Union was by rapid U.S. military build-up and the Strategic Defense Initiative.

The NSDD-75 also included ideological objectives, such as: “U.S. policy must have an
ideological thrust which affirms the superiority of U.S. and Western values of individual dignity
and freedom, a free press, free trade unions, free enterprise, and political democracy over the
repressive features of Soviet Communism.” This paper breaks down these national security
documents through unclassified sources and analysis from various scholars, which gives a clear
and definite understanding of how these policies ended the Cold War. Moreover, to analyze these
policies by today’s standards and how policymakers can use with rising global powers such as
the Communist Chinese Party and Russian influence.
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How Reagan’s National Security Decision Directives Can be Applied Today

The Reagan administration directed an assertive campaign to proactively challenge the
Soviet Union, including mitigating the Soviet influence over Eastern Europe. President Reagan’s
top advisor, Richard Pipes, joined Reagan’s National Security Council in 1982. Pipes established
the two fundamental National Security Decision Directives and formed an Active Measures
Group, including orchestrating an extensive series of irregular operations and strategies
worldwide. Reagan’s National Security Council worked on a strategic level that outlined an
assertive campaign to contend the Soviets. On May 20, 1982, Reagan signed into law the NSDD32 that authorized “diplomatic, propaganda, military, and political action to contain and reserve
the expansion of Soviet control and military presence through the world” (Going on the
Offensive: A U.S. Strategy to Combat Russian Information Warfare, n.d.).

Reagan then signed the NSDD-54 on September 2, 1982, titled “U.S. Policies Towards
Eastern Europe.” The NSDD-54 stretched further past the NSDD-32; it would be the policy that
would release Moscow’s grip from Eastern Europe; thus, it included “encouraging more liberal
trends in the region” (Going on the Offensive: A U.S. Strategy to Combat Russian Information
Warfare, n.d.). Moreover, to “reinforce the pro-Western orientation of their peoples.” Likewise,
“undermining the military capabilities of the Warsaw Pact.” In January of 1983, the Reagan
administration released the NSDD-75, titled “U.S. Relations with the U.S.S.R.” The policy
declared that the U.S. and Soviet Union system would no longer coincide (Going on the
Offensive: A U.S. Strategy to Combat Russian Information Warfare, n.d.). The NSDD-75 stated
that three inter-related missions would be within the policy regarding the Soviet Union. Once, to
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reserve the Soviet Union to expand by competing on a continuous basis and change the Soviet
Union toward a pluralistic political and economic system; likewise, to undertake negotiations
with the Soviet Union, which secured and magnified U.S. interest (Going on the Offensive: A
U.S. Strategy to Combat Russian Information Warfare, n.d.).

Moreover, the NSDD-75 contended the U.S. had to utilize a comprehensive array of
military, economic, political, and other various tools such as ideology. Hence, “U.S. policy must
have an ideological thrust which affirms the superiority of U.S. and Western values of individual
dignity and freedom, and political democracy over the repressive features of Soviet
Communism” (Clark, 1983). The NSDD-75 emphasized that Eastern Europe was the focal point
of the policy, stating, “The primary U.S. objective in Eastern Europe is to loosen Moscow hold
on the region while promoting the cause of human rights in individual Eastern European
countries” (Clark, 1983). Furthermore, Active Measures Working Group used the documents to
search for propaganda that the Soviet Union was overtly using. The group “worked as an
interrogative organization which would compile examples of Soviet disinformation” (Clark,
1983). The group would then use the C.I.A.’s forgeries database containing U.S. intelligence
experts and K.G.B. defectors. In contrast, the group would publish the results to inform a cast
audience of U.S. government officials, foreign officials, and journalists (Going on the Offensive:
A U.S. Strategy to Combat Russian Information Warfare, n.d.).

Led by the U.S. State Department, the group would eventually publish many reports on
Soviet disinformation and anti-American K.G.B. forgeries. The Reagan administration
aggressively campaigned against the Soviet influence around the world. The U.S. and Soviet
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military were at significant risk of a nuclear confrontation. Therefore, Reagan believed that using
unconventional tactics would be the better route to take in order to counter Russia elaborating
through local surrogates. Hence, the administration organized an enormous scope of
unconventional programs around the globe, such as Europe, the Middle East, Latin America, and
many other continents. Richard Pipes’ National Security Decision Directives became a pivotal
element to the Reagan Doctrine.

The multi-faceted foreign policy gave a vast increase in pro-freedom public diplomacy
that essentially drove the Soviet’s economy to its collapse by reducing the oil price, including
increasing U.S. support of anti-communist forces within Afghanistan and Nicaragua. In 1976,
Pipes also assisted in developing public policy when leading a coalition by the name of “Team
B” in which analyzed Soviet military strategy and U.S. foreign policy, the team was made up of
military and foreign policy professionals. “Team B” advocated for policy that heightened
aggression towards the Soviet Union; likewise, leaving no accommodating policy towards
Russia. The action was first recommended by the C.I.A.’s team, “Team A.” The analysis by
Team B facilitated the offensive strategy of the Reagan Doctrine and, in turn, drew the Cold War
to a close (Going on the Offensive: A U.S. Strategy to Combat Russian Information Warfare,
n.d.).

Today, Russia considers the United States as its greatest adversary. To cause discord
within the U.S., Russian leaders often engage in aggressive onslaught disinformation campaigns.
And, most importantly, Washington D.C. undermined the United States’ influence on the world
stage and increased their influence. On January 10, 2018, The Moscow Times released a survey
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by the Levada Center, which suggested that 66% of Russians believed that their country had an
enemy. Of those, two-thirds indicated that the U.S. was Russia’s most prominent adversary.
Moscow’s efforts have responded to what they perceive as three decades of indignity due to the
collapse of the Soviet Union, along with Russia’s displeasure of the European Union and NATO
expanding in proximity to their border, especially Ukraine. In past years since the Reagan
administration, has at times been maladroit to Russia’s information warfare; this was due to the
United States’ implications in being able and ill-prepared to combat a new Cold War. Once 9/11
occurred, the U.S. focused on lethal operations versus political and information. Hence, being
able to target terrorists by using precision-strike capabilities. However, such resources and
weaponry have a limited influence against adversaries that fight information and disinformation
warfare.
The United States’ single most important necessity is developing an information warfare
campaign that properly competes against adversaries such as Communist China and Russia. As
reviewed in the latter section of the essay, the United States effectively and proactively
established an information campaign to counter the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The
movement was accomplished by a combination of overt and covert programs. The Reagan
administration becomes a successful playbook that is a crucial model of success in countering
Communist China and Russia. The U.S. strategy and covert operations implemented during the
Cold War provide a valuable outline for today’s adversaries. Moscow often targets Facebook,
Instagram, and various media applications of today’s Information Age, far different from the
Soviet Union’s targets during the Cold War era. However, the importance and necessity for the
U.S. countering Russian influence is still the same needed end goal as during the Cold War. The
importance of defense, such as protecting allied cyber networks, disinformation, and exposing
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the Russian online influence, can be significantly thwarted by the U.S. government
implementing an offensive information campaign similar to the Reagan administration.

The U.S. should punish Russia as soon as these incidents are identified by pressuring
Russia to inhibit its information warfare campaign; likewise, exploiting Russia’s weaknesses.
This could be managed by a series of steps similar to the National Security Decision Directives
designed and used during the Reagan administration. These steps also can counter Communist
China in information warfare. First, U.S. leaders have to be clear and straightforward in warning
Russian leaders publicly and privately that any information warfare will be countered with equal
importance and force. When the Soviet Union influenced the globe during the Cold War,
President Reagan actively responded by vowing to put the communist ideology where it
belonged, stating, “leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash-heap of history.” The Soviets understood
quite quickly that Reagan was resolute in his warnings on combating them on every front
necessary. Secondly, the U.S. must continue developing state-of-the-art offensive cyber
capabilities, which is greatly needed to counter Communist China and Russia as attacks from
both nations have become increasingly more dangerous and frequent. And thirdly, the U.S.
should take an active role in destabilizing both China and Russia economically, including their
military capabilities, and diplomatically. If needed, the U.S. more than likely can provide overt
and covert backing to nations such as Ukraine to combat and weaken Russia’s influence and grip
on that region (Going on the Offensive: A U.S. Strategy to Combat Russian Information
Warfare, n.d.).
Communist China poses a similar threat as Russia does. Therefore, an action similar to
the National Security Decision Directive 75 would provide a similar opposition counter. The
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policy was meant to compete against the Soviet Union in all the international arenas. China has
become a dominating force economically through its relationship with the U.S. and other various
large markets. The nation has also put itself in a central position in global supply and is
significantly financed by multinational corporations and financial institutions that have
increasingly given China vast wealth. The U.S. enabling our corporations to expand and increase
Communist China’s wealth will inevitably lead to many implications throughout our economy
and supply chain. To counter the C.C.P. and its preeminence, the U.S. should restrain
investments to Chinese corporations and industries known to support the C.C.P. and their human
rights violations.

Also, the U.S. should block all access to U.S. technology and any areas to give the C.C.P.
access to possible military technology advancement. Further action such as constructing a new
global trade to decrease dependency on China would also benefit U.S. National Security. To
quote Congressman Mike Gallagher, “To wage a Reagan-style ideological offensive against
China’s communist government, the United States must first promote its track record and values
as a direct contrast to the C.C.P. America’s diplomatic and development achievements are an
indispensable public diplomacy asset that China’s Communist leaders cannot hope to match.
Reagan was fond of arguing that even former adversaries, once incorporated into the Americanled international community, have prospered economically and politically. America’s historic
magnanimity is especially potent in light of the C.C.P.’s growing reputation for debt traps,
economic coercion, and regional bullying” (Gallagher, n.d.).
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China’s activities are retrospective to the Soviet Union attempting to expand influence
and counteracting democracies throughout the developing world, such as Taiwan. Although, the
Soviets, for the most part, fought proxy wars in opposition to the U.S., unlike China thus far.
However, adopting a new form of the Reagan Doctrine to counter China’s opportunities to
expand and influence by economic and political power would be an exceptional route for
Washington D.C. The dissimilarity between countering China versus the Soviet Union is that
rather than providing weaponry to various countries, giving other forms of support such as
offering an alternative to Chinese investment and financing would help vulnerable countries
resist Chinese influence.
Moreover, “The most interesting conclusion concerning the end of the U.S.S.R. by the
general secretary of China’s Communist Party is that the Soviets were insufficiently dedicated to
an ideology. According to Xi, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union became corrupted by
wealth, leading to a loss of faith and political legitimacy. As Xi put it: ‘The wavering of
idealistic faith is the most dangerous form of wavering. A political party’s decline often starts
with the loss or lack of idealistic faith’” (Gallagher, n.d.). This being said, Xi already suggests
that China is a considerably large superpower that cannot afford to waver the same as the Soviet
Union under the pressure of the Reagan administration. Xi knows that once their political system
was to be actively challenged to such a degree, it would waver.

In 2019, the United States was estimated to spend $649 billion on military capabilities. At
the same time, China ranked second to military spending, which was about $261 billion. By
monitoring China’s defense budget, we can try to avoid the issue of being unaware of their
military build-up as the U.S. was of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union absorbed ten countries
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and did so on an average of one every six months. However, this was mainly due to the U.S.
failing in Vietnam, which was bolstered by a significant military build-up. By around 1979,
under President Jimmy Carter, the Soviet Union military spending was approximated at 12 to 14
percent of Russia’s G.P.N.; likewise, it was up 70% more in the U.S. dollar than U.S. defense
spending (Holzman, 1989). In November of 1979, during the Iran hostage crisis, public opinion
questioned the U.S. military capabilities; Carter responded by furthering the defense budget.
However, Reagan made it a point to add to Carter’s defense spending proposal once he took
office. U.S. defense spending had increased from $134 billion in 1980 to $253 billion in 1985,
which increased by 42%, which was greatly needed to counter the Soviet Union to show the
United States strength on the world stage (Wrabley, 1991).

To quote President Reagan’s top advisor, Richard Pipes, “Because totalitarian rule strives
for the impossible and wants to place at its disposal the personality of man and destiny, it can be
realized only in a fragmentary manner. It lies in its being that its goal can never be attained and
made total but must remain a tendency, a claim to rule. Totalitarian rule is not a thoroughly
rationalized apparatus that works with equal effectiveness in all its parts. This is something it
would well like to be, and in some places, it may perhaps approach this ideal, but seen as a
whole, its claim to power is realizable only in a diffuse manner, with very different intensities at
various times in various realms of life; at the same time, totalitarian and non-totalitarian features
are always commingled. But this is precisely why the consequences of the totalitarian claim to
power are so dangerous and oppressive because they are so hazy, so incalculable, and so difficult
to demonstrate. This contortion follows from the unfulfillable aspiration to power: it
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characterizes life under such a regime and makes it so exceedingly difficult for all outsiders to
grasp” (Edwards, n.d.).
Conclusion

In conclusion, there is great importance for the U.S. to incorporate National Security
Decision Directive 75 to today’s policies towards both China and Russia to contain and over
time reverse expansionism while working towards, as the document stated, “a more pluralistic
political system.” The document also included, “U.S. policy on economic relations with the
U.S.S.R. must serve strategic and foreign policy goals as well as economic interests. In this
context, U.S. objectives are above all to ensure that east West economic relations do not facilitate
the Soviet military build-up. This requires preventing the transfer of technology and equipment
that would substantially contribute directly or indirectly to Soviet military power. And to avoid
subsidizing the soviet economy or unduly easing the burden of soviet resources allocate
decisions so as not to dilute pressures for structural change in the Soviet system.” Such economic
sanctions would benefit from containing China’s economic expansion and wealth, which
minimizes their capabilities in defense spending and puts pressure on democracies such as
Taiwan.
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